Date: 12-27-2015

Case Style: Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. St. Louis

Case Number: SJC-11862

Judge: Francis X. Spina

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Plaintiff's Attorney: John P. Bossé

Defendant's Attorney: Mike Hickson

Description: In this case, we are asked to examine whether the term "intellectual disability" in G. L. c. 265, § 13F
(indecent assault and battery on a person with an intellectual disability), renders the statute unconstitutionally vague. On
the effective date of November 2, 2010, the Legislature amended the statute substituting the term "mentally retarded person"
with "person with an intellectual disability" as well as the words "be mentally retarded" with "have an intellectual
disability." St. 2010, c. 239, §§ 71-72. These amendments were part of a broad legislative scheme that purged the term
"mentally retarded" from the General Laws. St. 2010, c. 239 ("An Act eliminating the word 'retardation' from the General
Laws"). As a result, G. L. c. 265, § 13F, now states: "Whoever commits an indecent assault and battery on a person with an
intellectual disability knowing such person to have an intellectual disability shall . . . be punished . . . ." The
term "intellectual disability" is not defined by the statute. The defendant was convicted on four indictments alleging
indecent assault and battery on a person with an intellectual disability,1 one indictment alleging indecent exposure, and one
One indictment involved the touching of the defendant's penis by the victim. A second involved the defendant touching the victim's vagina with his hands. A third involved the defendant touching the victim's breast with his hands. The fourth involved the defendant touching the victim's breast with indictment alleging accosting or annoying a person of the
opposite sex. The crimes were alleged to have occurred between on or about January 1, 2008, which was before the effective date of the statutory amendments, and on or about September 16, 2011. At the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, the defendant moved for required findings of not guilty on all charges. A judge in the Superior Court entered a required finding of not guilty on an indictment alleging intimidation of a witness but denied the motion as to the remaining charges.
At the close of all the evidence, the defendant renewed his motion for required findings of not guilty on the remaining
charges, which was denied. Appellate proceedings were stayed to allow the defendant to file postconviction motions. The
defendant filed postconviction motions for a new trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001),2
and for a required finding of not guilty under Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (b) (2), as amended, 420 Mass. 1502 (1995),3 both of which
his mouth. The jury found him not guilty on a fifth indictment involving evidence that he put his mouth on the victim's vagina.
2 In his motion for a new trial, the defendant alleged that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss the indictments charging indecent assault on a person with an intellectual disability on grounds that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, and that he had been charged under an ex post facto law.
3 In his postconviction motion for required findings of not guilty, the defendant alleged that the evidence was insufficient
4
were denied by the trial judge. The defendant appealed from the
denial of his postconviction motions. The Appeals Court
consolidated the two appeals. We transferred the case to this
court on our own motion.
On appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the term
"intellectual disability" renders G. L. c. 265, § 13F,
unconstitutionally vague; (2) that he was convicted under an ex
post facto law; (3) that the judge erred by denying certain of
his motions for a required finding of not guilty; and (4) that
the judge erred by denying his motion for a new trial. For the
following reasons, we conclude that G. L. c. 265, § 13F, is
constitutional, and we affirm the judge's rulings.
1. Background. The jury could have found the following
facts. In 2013, at the time of trial, Amy4 was a twenty-four
year old woman. At the time of the incidents, Amy lived in a
farmhouse with a wraparound porch in Hancock with her mother and
her maternal grandfather. She was adopted at birth, and at the
age of eight months she was diagnosed with "slow learning" and
"special needs." Amy reads at a third or fourth grade level and
has a verbal intelligence quotient (IQ) of forty-seven. In
to warrant convictions on the indictments charging him with indecent assault and battery on a person with an intellectual disability, and that he had been charged under an ex post facto law.
4 A pseudonym.
5
2008, after Amy reached age eighteen, her mother and grandfather
were appointed legal guardians of her. According to the
permanent decree of guardianship admitted in evidence, a judge
in the Probate and Family Court found that Amy is "mentally
retarded" and that failure to appoint a guardian would create
risk to her health and welfare. The medical certificate
supporting the permanent decree of guardianship details Amy's
disability as being mental retardation and states that she lacks
the ability to make decisions without adult supervision.5
At the time of trial, the defendant was seventy-two years
old. He is a retired boat builder, which he had done for forty
six years, but he continued to work part time doing fiberglass
work. His hobbies included hunting and fishing. He and a
friend used to hunt in western Massachusetts. The friend
introduced him to Amy's great grandmother. In the early 1980s,
he began to hunt on the property where Amy and her family live.
The defendant and Amy's grandfather forged a friendship and grew
close over the years. The defendant would visit the family two
to three times a year and hunt on the property. He typically
would stay for one or two weeks at a time in his camper, which
5 The medical certificate also reports that Amy's most recent evaluations at the time illustrated her problem-solving ability to be at a four year old level.
6
he parked behind the farmhouse. The defendant came to know Amy,
and he described her as behaving "like a child more or less."
On September 11, 2011, Amy and the defendant were sitting
side by side, alone on the porch. The boy friend of Amy's
mother was folding laundry in front of a window overlooking the
porch. While sitting next to the defendant, Amy dropped her
hand to his leg and slowly moved her hand up toward the
defendant's crotch area. Amy began to "rub" and "pet" the
defendant's penis over his pants. Amy testified that the
defendant did not ask her to do this but that it was "his idea."
Amy's mother's boy friend watched this occur from the window,
and after watching for a few moments, he went to the staircase
and called up to Amy's mother to come downstairs. She and her
boy friend watched Amy and the defendant from the downstairs
window. Amy's mother saw Amy's hand on the defendant's leg,
next to his penis. Upon seeing this, Amy's mother frantically
knocked on the window and told Amy to come inside.
Amy went inside, and her mother took her upstairs to talk
to her. Once they were upstairs, Amy began to tell her mother
about various incidents when the defendant touched her
inappropriately. Amy's mother made written notes of Amy's
account of the incidents.6 These incidents occurred over a
6 Amy's mother testified as a first complaint witness.
7
period of three years, always outside the defendant's camper.7
Amy would walk with the defendant back to his camper after
dinner. According to Amy's testimony, the defendant touched her
breasts, her vagina, and kissed her multiple times on the mouth,
breasts, and vagina. Amy testified that these events made her
feel uncomfortable. She testified to one particular incident
where the defendant put his hand on the back of her head and
forced her head down toward his penis because he wanted her to
perform oral sex. She refused and told him she did not want to
do that. The defendant told her to keep it a secret because, if
she did not, he could get in trouble. Amy testified that the
defendant's penis was exposed but that she could not see it
because it was dark out and she could not describe it.
After the September 11 incident, Amy was not allowed to go
outside the house while the defendant was still on the property,
and the defendant was not allowed in the home. The defendant
stayed for about another week on the property. A few days after
Amy made these disclosures, her mother reported the incidents to
the police, who then began an investigation.
2. Indecent assault and battery on person with
intellectual disability. a. Constitutionality of G. L. c. 265,
7 Although Amy testified that these various incidents of inappropriate touching occurred over three years, the record does not state specific dates. Three years before the September 11, 2011, porch incident would be 2008, before the effective date of the statutory amendments.
8
§ 13F. The defendant argues that the term "intellectual
disability" renders § 13F unconstitutionally vague on its face
under the State and Federal Constitutions because the term is a
"neologism" that does not have a usual and accepted meaning. We
disagree. The defendant did not raise the issue in a pretrial
motion to dismiss, the required procedure for a facial challenge
based on vagueness.8 See Commonwealth v. Moses, 436 Mass. 598,
605 n.4 (2002); Commonwealth v. Chou, 433 Mass. 229, 237 (2001).
We review under the standard of a substantial risk of a
miscarriage of justice.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is well established in our
jurisprudence. "It is a basic principle of due process that an
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not
clearly defined." Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108
(1972). A criminal statute must define the offense "in terms
that are sufficiently clear to permit a person of average
intelligence to comprehend what conduct is prohibited."
Commonwealth v. Spano, 414 Mass. 178, 180 (1993). See Kolender
v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); Commonwealth v. Bohmer, 374
8 An as-applied challenge based on vagueness frequently depends on the evidence at trial, and may be raised in a motion for a required finding of not guilty. See Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski, 418 Mass. 543, 545 (1994). If a defendant fails to raise an as-applied challenge in a motion for a required finding of not guilty, the issue will be considered under the standard of a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Chou, 433 Mass. 229, 238 (2001).
9
Mass. 368, 371-372 (1978). "When a statute does not define its
words we give them their usual and accepted meanings, as long as
these meanings are consistent with the statutory purpose. . . .
We derive the words' usual and accepted meanings from sources
presumably known to the statute's enactors, such as their use in
other legal contexts and dictionary definitions" (citations
omitted). Commonwealth v. Bell, 442 Mass. 118, 124 (2004). A
criminal statute must not be so vague that it opens itself up to
arbitrary enforcement and prosecution. See Grayned, supra at
108-109; Commonwealth v. Freiberg, 405 Mass. 282, 289, cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 940 (1989). "[A] vague statute offends by its
lack of reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement and its
consequent encouragement of arbitrary and erratic arrests and
prosecutions." Commonwealth v. Sefranka, 382 Mass. 108, 110
(1980).
However, "[i]t is not infrequent that prescribed conduct is
incapable of precise legal definition." Jaquith v.
Commonwealth, 331 Mass. 439, 442 (1954). "[L]egislative
language need not be afforded 'mathematical precision' in order
to pass constitutional muster." Commonwealth v. Reyes, 464
Mass. 245, 249 (2013), quoting Bohmer, 374 Mass. at 372. A
statute will be deemed constitutional if it "conveys [a]
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practices." Commonwealth
10
v. Adams, 389 Mass. 265, 270 (1983), quoting Commonwealth v.
Jarrett, 359 Mass. 491, 496-497 (1971). See Reyes, supra.
In this case, we conclude that the term "intellectual
disability" is sufficiently clear and definite and is therefore
not unconstitutionally vague. The legislative history of § 13F,
as amended through St. 2010, c. 239, §§ 71-72, makes it clear
that the Legislature's intent was merely to change the
nomenclature and not the substance of the statute.
Section § 13F was amended in 2010 in conjunction with
numerous other laws by an act entitled, "An Act eliminating the
word 'retardation' from the General Laws." St. 2010, c. 239.
The only revision made to § 13F was a substitution of the term
"person with an intellectual disability" for the term "mentally
retarded person" and the words "have an intellectual disability"
for "be mentally retarded." No substantive changes to § 13F
were made by these amendments. This change in language was part
of a larger legislative scheme to eradicate the pejorative term
"mentally retarded" from the General Laws.9 St. 2010, c. 239.10
9 In addition to purging the General Laws of the term "mentally retarded," many other similar modifications took place in the quest for more respectful language. Prior to 2009, the Department of Developmental Services, the agency charged with providing services to individuals with intellectual disabilities, was known as the Department of Mental Retardation. See G. L. c. 19B, § 1, as amended through St. 2008, c. 182, § 9. Correspondingly, the department amended its regulations by substituting "intellectual disability" for the term "mental retardation," but notably did not alter the substantive
11
Indeed, Massachusetts was part of a nationwide trend by which
the United States Congress and many other State Legislatures
enacted similar legislation in order to promote respect and
dignity to those with intellectual disabilities.11 The
definition. Compare 115 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.01 (2009) (defining "mental retardation" as "significantly sub-average intellectual functioning existing concurrently and related to significant limitations in adaptive functioning. Mental retardation manifests before age [eighteen]"), with 115 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.01 (2012) (defining "intellectual disability" as "significantly sub-average intellectual functioning existing concurrently with and related to significant limitations in adaptive functioning. Intellectual Disability originates before age [eighteen]").
Additionally, Governor Deval Patrick issued an executive order to rename the Governor's Commission on Mental Retardation as the Governor's Commission on Intellectual Disability. Executive Order No. 521 (Mar. 31, 2010). In support of renaming the commission, the executive order referenced the widespread movement in using "intellectual disability," stating, "[Whereas], there is a strong trend, nationally and internationally, to use the term 'intellectual disability' rather than mental retardation . . . ." Id.
10 The Legislature did not succeed completely in eliminating the term "mentally retarded" from the General Laws. The last sentence of the second paragraph of G. L. c. 265, § 13F, was not amended, and states: "This section shall not apply to the commission of an assault and battery by a mentally retarded person upon another mentally retarded person." We perceive this to be a mere oversight that does not affect our analysis.
11 In 2010, President Barack Obama signed legislation entitled "Rosa's Law" that amended various Federal education, labor, and health laws by removing the words "mental retardation" and replacing them with the words "intellectual disabilities." Pub. L. 111-256, 111th Cong., 124 Stat. 2643 (2010). In 2012, California enacted a law that eliminated the words "mentally retarded" in State laws, regulations, and publications and replaced them with the words "intellectual disability." 2012 Cal. St. c. 457. In 2013, the Social
12
Legislature did not intend to change the substance of the
statute with the substitution of the words "intellectual
disability" but only intended the statute to contain more
respectful and acceptable terms.
The term "intellectual disability" is not defined by § 13F.
In such cases we apply the familiar rule of statutory
construction that guides us to give the words "their usual and
accepted meanings, as long as these meanings are consistent with
the statutory purpose." Bell, 442 Mass. at 124, quoting
Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 369 (1977). As
has been discussed, "intellectual disability" has become the
accepted term for someone who would have been described as
mentally retarded prior to the various statutory and regulatory
amendments. The definition of "mentally retarded" in 115 Code
Security Administration promulgated a final rule that eliminated the term "mental retardation" and replaced it with "intellectual disability." 78 Fed. Reg. 46,499 (2013). The agency explained, "This change reflects the widespread adoption of the term 'intellectual disability' by Congress, government agencies, and various public and private organizations." Id. The United States Supreme Court has discontinued use of the term "mental retardation" and now uses the term "intellectual disability." Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014). Justice Kennedy, in an opinion analyzing a Florida statute regarding the death penalty and intellectually disabled defendants, stated by way of introduction: "Previous opinions of this Court have employed the term 'mental retardation.' This opinion uses the term 'intellectual disability' to describe the identical phenomenon." Id. He went on to explain that the term "intellectual disability" is also used in the latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Id.
13
Mass. Regs. § 2.01 prior to the 2010 statutory amendments was
identical to the definition given to the term "intellectual
disability" in the regulations after the statutory amendments.
See note 9, supra.
Prior to the 2010 amendments, Massachusetts courts had
referenced the definition of "mental retardation" found in the
regulations of the Department of Developmental Services
(department) to define "mental retardation" under § 13F and
other statutes. See e.g., Commowealth v. Fuller, 66 Mass. App.
Ct. 84, 96 (2006); Commonwealth v. Aitahmedlamara, 63 Mass. App.
Ct. 76, 76-77 (2005) (discussing "usual and accepted meaning" of
"mental retardation" under § 13F). "Administrative regulations
have been frequently used as guides to determine the meaning of
statutory provisions." 1A N.J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer,
Statutes and Statutory Construction § 31.6, at 696 (7th ed.
2009). In Fuller, supra, the Appeals Court held that an
instruction given to a jury regarding the definition of "mental
retardation" "was consistent with the usual and accepted
understanding of the meaning of the words 'mentally retarded' as
well as the definition promulgated by the [Department of Mental
Retardation] at 115 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.01 (1994)."12 Fuller,
12 In Executive Order No. 521, changing the name of the Governor's Commission on Mental Retardation, Governor Deval Patrick stated, "[Whereas], the Department of Developmental Services changed its regulations to make the term 'intellectual
14
supra. The trial judge in Fuller had instructed the jury that
"[a] mentally retarded person is a person who, as a result of
inadequately developed or impaired intelligence, is
substantially limited in his or her ability to learn or to adapt
to the means necessary to function effectively in the
community." Id. at 94. As noted above in note 9, the
regulations since have been amended and now include the more
accepted term "intellectual disability." Those regulations
define "intellectual disability" in identical terms as the term
"mental retardation" previously had been defined. Where "mental
retardation"13 is itself a commonly understood term, see id. at
96, and where it is synonymous with "intellectual disability,"
the latter also is a commonly understood term.
In addition to the regulatory definition, the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders defines "intellectual
disability" as "a disorder with onset during the developmental
period that includes both intellectual and adaptive functioning
disability' synonymous with mental retardation . . . ." Executive Order No. 521 (Mar. 31, 2010).
13 The 2012 regulations also noted that the substituted definition is consistent with the standard used in the eleventh edition of American Association of Intellectual Disabilities: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports (2010). 115 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.01 (2012).
15
deficits in conceptual, social, and practical domains."14
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders 33 (5th ed. 2013). These definitions
maintain the core concept that an intellectual disability
consists of intellectual limitations and affects adaptive
behaviors. In this case, no one questioned whether Amy in fact
had an intellectual disability. The defendant himself
acknowledged on direct examination that he knew Amy had
"intellectual disabilities" and the record demonstrates that it
was generally understood that Amy had an intellectual
disability. We conclude that the term "intellectual disability"
has an accepted and well understood meaning, and applying that
meaning to the defendant does not render the statute
unconstitutionally vague.
The defendant also argues the judge's instructions defined
the term "intellectual disability" in a manner that was
erroneous.15 The judge's instruction incorporated the definition
14 The American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities defines "intellectual disability" as "a disability characterized by significant limitations both in intellectual functioning . . . and in adaptive behavior." See American Association on Intellectual and Development Disabilities, Frequently Asked Questions on Intellectual Disability, http://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/definition/ faqs-on-intellectual-disability#.VfxrPVKFNaR [http://perma.cc/ G6CS-5V5G].
15 The defendant does not allege error for the remaining portions of the jury instructions. The trial judge instructed
16
of "person with disability" from G. L. c. 265, § 13K, which
proscribes assault and battery on an elderly or disabled person.
The defendant contends that this definition did not cure the
problem of vagueness in § 13F, and it permitted the jury to
convict him under § 13K. The defendant did not object to the
trial judge's instructions. We review the instruction under the
standard of a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See
Commonwealth v. Ford, 424 Mass. 709, 712 (1997); Commonwealth v.
Mitchell, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 556, 565 (2006). We look to the
jury instructions as a whole in order to determine if there was
a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See
Commonwealth v. Shea, 467 Mass. 788, 796 (2014); Commonwealth v.
Whitman, 430 Mass. 746, 755 (2000). We agree that the trial
judge's jury instructions regarding the definition of
"intellectual disability" were erroneous. However, the error
did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.
General Laws c. 265, § 13K, defines "person with
disability" as "a person with a permanent or long-term physical
or mental impairment that prevents or restricts the individual's
ability to provide for his or her own care or protection." The
definition of "person with disability" in § 13K encompasses a
the jury that "intellectual disability is a permanent or longterm mental impairment that prevents or restricts the individual's ability to provide for her own care or protection."
17
greater variety of disabilities than does § 13F, including
Alzheimer's disease and a number of other disabilities.
However, it also includes "intellectual disability" under § 13F.
The erroneous jury instruction did not create a substantial
risk of a miscarriage of justice because the disability that was
the focus of the evidence at trial was an intellectual
disability. Amy's condition met the definition from § 13K that
the judge used to instruct the jury, and it is highly unlikely
that the jury would have based its verdict on any other
disability, such as Alzheimer's disease. We conclude that the
defendant has failed to show the existence of a substantial risk
of a miscarriage of justice. In future trials under § 13F, it
would be appropriate to instruct a jury with the definition of
"intellectual disability" as used in the regulations of the
department. That definition is consistent with other
organizations' definition of "intellectual disability" and is
well understood.
b. Motion for required findings of not guilty. i.
Consent. The defendant argues that his trial and posttrial
motions for required findings of not guilty should have been
granted as to the indictment under G. L. c. 265, § 13F,
concerning the incident on September 11, 2011, because the
Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence of lack of consent.
The Commonwealth argues that the judge correctly denied the
18
defendant's motions because there was sufficient evidence that
the defendant intended for Amy to touch his penis and that the
combination of her intellectual disability and the significant
age difference between them is sufficient to prove Amy did not
consent to the touching on that date. When deciding a motion
for a required finding of not guilty, we view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v.
Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979). We must determine
whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. 94, 120 (2010), quoting
Latimore, supra at 677.
The elements of an indecent assault and battery on a person
with an intellectual disability include lack of consent, and the
Commonwealth bears the burden of production and persuasion on
the issue. See Commonwealth v. Portonova, 69 Mass. App. Ct.
905, 906 (2007). The element of lack of consent in a
prosecution for indecent assault and battery is the same as in a
prosecution for rape.16 See Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 456 Mass.
16 Capacity to consent may be an issue in such cases. "In order to give consent a person must . . . have the capacity to do so." Commonwealth v. Burke, 390 Mass. 480, 484 (1983). Capacity to consent can be affected by a number of different factors, including intoxication, consumption of drugs, sleep, unconsciousness, head injury, and intellectual disability. See Commonwealth v. Blache, 450 Mass. 583, 590 n.10 (2008). The judge did not instruct the jury on lack of capacity to consent,
19
135, 138 (2010); Commonwealth v. Simcock, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 184,
188 (1991). In this case, the Commonwealth presented sufficient
evidence from which the jury could find that, in the totality of
the circumstances, including Amy's intellectual disability, Amy
did not consent.
The evidence of Amy's intellectual disability was
prevalent. Amy's mother testified that she was diagnosed with
"slow learning, special needs" when she was eight months old.
She also revealed that Amy was missing the left half of her
cerebellum. Amy read at a third or fourth grade level and her
mother described her age range relative to over-all mental
capacity as spanning from that of a young age to that of a
teenager in regards to her moods. State police Trooper Dale
Gero, the officer who investigated the incidents, testified that
Amy appeared to act like a five to seven year old child.17 The
mother's boy friend described Amy as "basically" a child and as
"a woman with a child's mind." Amy had an IQ of forty-seven and
lacked the mental capabilities to complete a high school
thereby effectively removing the possibility of a verdict on that evidence alone. He only instructed on lack of consent, but told the jury that they could consider Amy's state of mind on this element of the Commonwealth's proof.
17 State police Trooper Dale Gero based his opinion on his observation of Amy and his experience of having a five year old daughter of his own.
20
program.18 Her mother testified that Amy's mental disability is
classified as mental retardation. Amy was not allowed to go
shopping by herself. Additionally, the jury were able to
observe Amy testify and assess the scope of her intellectual
disability. See Fuller, 66 Mass. App. Ct. at 90;
Aitahmedlamara, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 77-78 ("the victim
testified extensively at trial, and the jury were able from
their observations of her to assess both the question of her
mental retardation and the likelihood that the defendant was
aware of it"). While testifying, Amy required a number of
breaks.
There was evidence from which the jury could have found
that Amy perceived that the defendant had authority over her
because of his friendship with her family, "the considerable age
disparity between [them,] . . . and an obvious disparity in
experience and sophistication." Commonwealth v. Shore, 65 Mass.
App. Ct. 430, 432 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Castillo, 55
Mass. App. Ct. 563, 567 (2002). There was evidence of prior
unwanted sexual touching. With respect to the incidents before
September 11, 2011, Amy testified that she felt uncomfortable,
and that the defendant told her to keep these incidents secret
because he could get in trouble. The jury reasonably could have
18 Amy obtained a certificate of attendance in 2010 when she was twenty-two years old.
21
found that, in the totality of the circumstances, including
Amy's intellectual disability, she did not consent to the sexual
touching.
The fact that the defendant did not do the touching on this
occasion did not preclude the jury from convicting him of
indecent assault and battery on a person with an intellectual
disability. See Portonova, 69 Mass. App. Ct. at 905-906
(reiterating our case law does not require defendant to do
touching); Commonwealth v. Davidson, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 72, 73,
75-76 (2007) (defendant convicted of indecent assault and
battery on child under age of fourteen, G. L. c. 265, § 13B,
when victim touched his penis and rubbed his "private" with her
nose). "The gravity of the conduct rises to the level which
the[] statute[] [was] designed to prohibit." Davidson, supra at
75-76, quoting Commonwealth v. Nuby, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 360, 362
(1992).
ii. Ex post facto law. The defendant further argues that
his motions for required findings of not guilty as to the four
remaining indictments charging him with violations of § 13F
should have been allowed because the Commonwealth presented
insufficient evidence that these acts occurred after the 2010
amendments to § 13F. He further contends that as a result, his
convictions violate the prohibitions against ex post facto laws
under art. I, § 10, of the United States Constitution and art.
22
24 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Specifically, he
asserts that as a matter of law he could not have been convicted
under § 13F, based on conduct that occurred prior to November 2,
2010, when the statutory amendments took effect. As discussed
above, the substitution of the term "intellectual disability"
for "mental retardation" did not change the substance of the
statute. The two terms are synonymous. Therefore, the
defendant's conduct was illegal prior to the 2010 amendments as
well as after. The statutory amendments had no retrospective
effect that operated to the detriment of the defendant. See
Commonwealth v. Fuller, 421 Mass. 400, 408 (1995). The evidence
was sufficient, and the convictions do not violate the ex post
facto prohibitions of the Federal or Massachusetts
Constitutions.
c. Ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant
argues that the judge erred in the denial of his motion for a
new trial, which claimed that the defendant received ineffective
assistance of counsel. Specifically, the defendant asserts that
counsel failed to move to dismiss the complaint on the grounds
that G. L. c. 265, § 13F, was void for vagueness, failed to
argue effectively that the Commonwealth's evidence was
insufficient, and failed to request jury instructions that the
defendant could not be convicted based on acts occurring prior
to November 2, 2010, the effective date of the statutory
23
amendments. We conclude that the defendant's counsel was not
ineffective because such motions and arguments would not have
succeeded.
When analyzing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
a defendant must first show that "there has been serious
incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention of counsel" and
behavior that falls "measurably below that which might be
expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer." Commonwealth v.
Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974). If the first prong is
satisfied, then a defendant must show "whether it has likely
deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, substantial
ground of defence." Id.
For the reasons stated above, the defendant's trial counsel
would not have been successful on a motion to dismiss on the
ground that G. L. c. 265, § 13F, is void for vagueness.
Commonwealth v. Conceicao, 388 Mass. 255, 264 (1983) ("It is not
ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel declines to
file a motion with a minimal chance of success"). For the
reasons stated above, the defendant's other arguments also would
not have been successful.
3. Motion for required finding of not guilty -- indecent
exposure. The defendant asserts error in the denial of his
motion for a required finding on not guilty as to the indictment
alleging indecent exposure. Specifically, he argues that the
24
Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence that he
intentionally exposed his genitals to Amy and that Amy was
offended by the exposure.19 The Commonwealth argues that it
presented sufficient evidence on the charge of indecent exposure
because a reasonable person in Amy's position would have been
offended by the defendant's act of forcing Amy's head down
toward his penis for the purpose of placing her mouth on his
penis. We agree with the Commonwealth.
Indecent exposure requires proof of an "intentional act of
lewd exposure, offensive to one or more persons." Commonwealth
v. Swan, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 261 (2008), quoting Commonwealth
v. Broadland, 315 Mass. 20, 21-22 (1943). The exposure of one's
genitalia is a necessary element to indecent exposure.
Commonwealth v. Arthur, 420 Mass. 535, 540-541 (1995).
Offensive behavior are acts "that cause 'displeasure, anger or
resentment'" and are "repugnant to the prevailing sense of what
is decent or moral." Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 469 Mass. 621,
625 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Cahill, 446 Mass. 778, 781
(2006).
19 The defendant argues that the Commonwealth presented two independent factual bases for indecent exposure. However, this is unclear because the Commonwealth only discusses the incident where the defendant forced Amy's head down to his penis. The Commonwealth's argument that sufficient evidence was presented to convict on the charge of indecent exposure discussed only that one incident.
25
Amy testified that one night near the defendant's camper,
the defendant put his hand behind her head and forced it down
toward his "private part." When asked whether "boys pee from
their private part," Amy answered, "Yes." Amy first testified
that it was so dark out that she could not even see his "private
part." However, when asked whether his "private part" was
inside or outside of his pants, she responded that it was
outside of his pants. She could not remember what his "private
part" looked like. Amy testified that the defendant wanted her
to put her mouth on his "private part" but she told him no and
that she wanted to go inside.
The defendant argues that there is insufficient evidence
that he intentionally exposed his genitals to Amy. He argues
that Amy unambiguously testified that it was too dark out to see
the defendant's penis. Although Amy did testify that it was so
dark out that she could not even see his "private parts," she
also testified that his "private part" was outside of his pants.
Conflicting inferences that can be drawn from the evidence are
for the jury to resolve. Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass.
100, 113 (2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011). "When
assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we resolve issues of
credibility in favor of the Commonwealth . . . ." Commonwealth
v. James, 424 Mass. 770, 785 (1997). The jury reasonably could
infer (as did Amy when she testified that the defendant wanted
26
her to effect oral sex on him) that the defendant exposed his
penis and pushed her head down toward his penis because it was
his intention that Amy effect fellatio. We conclude that the
Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable
trier of fact to find that the defendant exposed his penis to
Amy.
The defendant further argues that Amy never testified that
she was offended any of the times that she saw the defendant's
penis.20 Although Amy never specifically testified that she was
offended by the defendant's actions, she did describe the
defendant's act of grabbing the back of her head and forcing her
head down toward his penis. She testified that she told him
that she did not want to do that and that she wanted to go
inside. A jury rationally could infer that by saying no and by
expressing her desire to detach herself from the situation, she
felt "displeasure" toward defendant's conduct. See Sullivan,
469 Mass. at 625, quoting Cahill, 446 Mass. at 781. We are
satisfied that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence
from which a reasonable trier of fact could determine that Amy
was offended by the defendant's conduct.
20 The defendant is unclear in his brief as to what incidents he is referring; however, he argues that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant exposed his genitals and on the same occasion offended the victim. We will limit our discussion to whether Amy was offended during the incident where the defendant forced her head down.
27
4. Motion for required finding of not guilty -- accosting
or annoying a person of the opposite sex. The defendant
contends that the judge erred by not granting his motion for a
required finding as to the indictment alleging accosting or
annoying a person of the opposite sex. Specifically, he argues
that the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to
establish that the defendant's conduct was disorderly. The
Commonwealth responds that the defendant's act of forcing Amy's
head toward his penis for the purpose of oral sex was offensive
and disorderly conduct.
General Laws c. 272, § 53, states that "persons who with
offensive and disorderly acts or language accost or annoy
another person . . . shall be punished." The statute requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was both offensive
and disorderly. Commonwealth v. Lombard, 321 Mass. 294, 296
(1947). The requirements of being offensive and being
disorderly are distinct from one another. Id. The Commonwealth
also must prove that the acts were offensive and disorderly to a
reasonable person, applying an objective standard. Sullivan,
469 Mass. at 625; Cahill, 446 Mass. at 781, citing Chou, 433
Mass. at 235.
Offensive acts, as discussed above "cause a complainant to
feel displeasure, anger, resentment, or the like, and such acts
or language would be considered indecent or immoral by a
28
reasonable person." Sullivan, 469 Mass. at 625. Offensive acts
also require "proof of sexual conduct or language, either
explicit or implicit." Id. at 626. We have determined that
explicit sexual conduct is self-explanatory and implicit sexual
conduct or language means conduct or language, "which a
reasonable person would construe as having sexual connotations."
Id.
Disorderly conduct is distinct from offensive conduct.
Lombard, 321 Mass. at 296. Disorderly acts "are those that
involve fighting or threatening, violent or tumultuous behavior,
or that create a hazardous or physically offensive condition for
no legitimate purpose of the actor, whether the resulting harm
is suffered in public by the public or in private by an
individual." Chou, 433 Mass. at 233. To be physically
offensive, a defendant must act in such a way that a reasonable
person would fear "imminent physical harm." Sullivan, 469 Mass.
at 627. Context is taken into account when analyzing whether
acts are physically offensive or threatening. Id. at 628,
quoting Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 9, 16 (2007)
("context is critical"). The jury could have found that the
defendant's act of forcing Amy's head down toward his penis
caused her to fear imminent physical harm.
The incident in question here is, again, the defendant's
act of forcing Amy's head down toward his penis. The defendant
29
argues that the evidence the Commonwealth presented demonstrates
that the defendant's actions were brief and minimal and fall
outside the spectrum of that which is offensive. We disagree.
As discussed above, the defendant's act of forcing Amy's head
down for the purpose of engaging in oral sex was offensive. As
the defendant was forcing her head down, Amy told him no and
that she wanted to go back inside. A reasonable person would
infer from Amy's inclination to go back inside that at the very
least she felt "displeasure," and in fact was offended by the
conduct. Sullivan, 469 Mass. at 625. The act of forcing Amy's
head down toward his penis also can be construed as a physically
offensive condition. Viewing the events in context, Amy
reasonably could have feared imminent physical harm. The
incident occurred outside, and at night, near the defendant's
camper. Amy is intellectually disabled and significantly
younger than the defendant. This was not just one isolated
incident of the defendant making sexual advances toward Amy.
Amy testified to various times where he touched her breasts and
her vagina. Viewing the defendant's actions within this context
could place a reasonable person in fear of imminent physical
harm. Additionally, forcing a person's head down toward one's
penis to engage in sexual conduct could place a reasonable
person in fear of imminent physical harm. We conclude that the
Commonwealth provided sufficient evidence that the defendant's
30
behavior was disorderly, and that the motion for a required
finding of not guilty properly was denied.

Outcome: For the foregoing reasons, we determine G. L. c. 265, § 13F, as amended through St. 2010, c. 239, §§ 71 72, to be constitutional, and we affirm the defendant's
convictions of indecent assault and battery on a person with an intellectual disability, indecent exposure, and accosting or annoying a person of the opposite sex. We also affirm the orders denying the defendant's motions for a new trial and for
required findings of not guilty.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

Comments: